^^&&^^

Edit File: SNMP-USER-BASED-SM-MIB.txt

SNMP-USER-BASED-SM-MIB DEFINITIONS ::= BEGIN

IMPORTS
    MODULE-IDENTITY, OBJECT-TYPE,
    OBJECT-IDENTITY,
    snmpModules, Counter32                FROM SNMPv2-SMI
    TEXTUAL-CONVENTION, TestAndIncr,
    RowStatus, RowPointer,
    StorageType, AutonomousType           FROM SNMPv2-TC
    MODULE-COMPLIANCE, OBJECT-GROUP       FROM SNMPv2-CONF
    SnmpAdminString, SnmpEngineID,
    snmpAuthProtocols, snmpPrivProtocols  FROM SNMP-FRAMEWORK-MIB;

snmpUsmMIB MODULE-IDENTITY
    LAST-UPDATED "200210160000Z"            -- 16 Oct 2002, midnight
    ORGANIZATION "SNMPv3 Working Group"
    CONTACT-INFO "WG-email:   snmpv3@lists.tislabs.com
                  Subscribe:  majordomo@lists.tislabs.com
                              In msg body:  subscribe snmpv3

Chair:      Russ Mundy
                              Network Associates Laboratories
                  postal:     15204 Omega Drive, Suite 300
                              Rockville, MD 20850-4601
                              USA
                  email:      mundy@tislabs.com

phone:      +1 301-947-7107

Co-Chair:   David Harrington
                              Enterasys Networks
                  Postal:     35 Industrial Way
                              P. O. Box 5004
                              Rochester, New Hampshire 03866-5005
                              USA
                  EMail:      dbh@enterasys.com
                  Phone:      +1 603-337-2614

Co-editor   Uri Blumenthal
                              Lucent Technologies
                  postal:     67 Whippany Rd.
                              Whippany, NJ 07981
                              USA
                  email:      uri@lucent.com
                  phone:      +1-973-386-2163

Co-editor:  Bert Wijnen
                              Lucent Technologies
                  postal:     Schagen 33
                              3461 GL Linschoten
                              Netherlands
                  email:      bwijnen@lucent.com
                  phone:      +31-348-480-685
                 "
    DESCRIPTION  "The management information definitions for the
                  SNMP User-based Security Model.

Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2002). This
                  version of this MIB module is part of RFC 3414;
                  see the RFC itself for full legal notices.
                 "
--  Revision history

REVISION     "200210160000Z"          -- 16 Oct 2002, midnight
    DESCRIPTION  "Changes in this revision:
                  - Updated references and contact info.
                  - Clarification to usmUserCloneFrom DESCRIPTION
                    clause
                  - Fixed 'command responder' into 'command generator'
                    in last para of DESCRIPTION clause of
                    usmUserTable.
                  This revision published as RFC3414.
                 "
    REVISION     "199901200000Z"          -- 20 Jan 1999, midnight
    DESCRIPTION  "Clarifications, published as RFC2574"

REVISION     "199711200000Z"          -- 20 Nov 1997, midnight
    DESCRIPTION  "Initial version, published as RFC2274"
    ::= { snmpModules 15 }

-- Administrative assignments ****************************************

usmMIBObjects     OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { snmpUsmMIB 1 }
usmMIBConformance OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { snmpUsmMIB 2 }

-- Identification of Authentication and Privacy Protocols ************

usmNoAuthProtocol OBJECT-IDENTITY
    STATUS        current
    DESCRIPTION  "No Authentication Protocol."
    ::= { snmpAuthProtocols 1 }

usmHMACMD5AuthProtocol OBJECT-IDENTITY
    STATUS        current
    DESCRIPTION  "The HMAC-MD5-96 Digest Authentication Protocol."
    REFERENCE    "- H. Krawczyk, M. Bellare, R. Canetti HMAC:
                    Keyed-Hashing for Message Authentication,
                    RFC2104, Feb 1997.
                  - Rivest, R., Message Digest Algorithm MD5, RFC1321.
                 "
    ::= { snmpAuthProtocols 2 }

usmHMACSHAAuthProtocol OBJECT-IDENTITY
    STATUS        current
    DESCRIPTION  "The HMAC-SHA-96 Digest Authentication Protocol."
    REFERENCE    "- H. Krawczyk, M. Bellare, R. Canetti, HMAC:
                    Keyed-Hashing for Message Authentication,
                    RFC2104, Feb 1997.
                  - Secure Hash Algorithm. NIST FIPS 180-1.
                 "
    ::= { snmpAuthProtocols 3 }

usmNoPrivProtocol OBJECT-IDENTITY
    STATUS        current
    DESCRIPTION  "No Privacy Protocol."
    ::= { snmpPrivProtocols 1 }

usmDESPrivProtocol OBJECT-IDENTITY
    STATUS        current
    DESCRIPTION  "The CBC-DES Symmetric Encryption Protocol."
    REFERENCE    "- Data Encryption Standard, National Institute of
                    Standards and Technology.  Federal Information
                    Processing Standard (FIPS) Publication 46-1.

Supersedes FIPS Publication 46,
                    (January, 1977; reaffirmed January, 1988).

- Data Encryption Algorithm, American National
                    Standards Institute.  ANSI X3.92-1981,
                    (December, 1980).

- DES Modes of Operation, National Institute of
                    Standards and Technology.  Federal Information
                    Processing Standard (FIPS) Publication 81,
                    (December, 1980).

- Data Encryption Algorithm - Modes of Operation,
                    American National Standards Institute.
                    ANSI X3.106-1983, (May 1983).
                 "
    ::= { snmpPrivProtocols 2 }

-- Textual Conventions ***********************************************

KeyChange ::=     TEXTUAL-CONVENTION
   STATUS         current
   DESCRIPTION
         "Every definition of an object with this syntax must identify
          a protocol P, a secret key K, and a hash algorithm H
          that produces output of L octets.

The object's value is a manager-generated, partially-random
          value which, when modified, causes the value of the secret
          key K, to be modified via a one-way function.

The value of an instance of this object is the concatenation
          of two components: first a 'random' component and then a
          'delta' component.

The lengths of the random and delta components
          are given by the corresponding value of the protocol P;
          if P requires K to be a fixed length, the length of both the
          random and delta components is that fixed length; if P
          allows the length of K to be variable up to a particular
          maximum length, the length of the random component is that
          maximum length and the length of the delta component is any
          length less than or equal to that maximum length.
          For example, usmHMACMD5AuthProtocol requires K to be a fixed
          length of 16 octets and L - of 16 octets.
          usmHMACSHAAuthProtocol requires K to be a fixed length of
          20 octets and L - of 20 octets. Other protocols may define
          other sizes, as deemed appropriate.

When a requester wants to change the old key K to a new
          key keyNew on a remote entity, the 'random' component is
          obtained from either a true random generator, or from a
          pseudorandom generator, and the 'delta' component is
          computed as follows:

- a temporary variable is initialized to the existing value
             of K;
           - if the length of the keyNew is greater than L octets,
             then:
              - the random component is appended to the value of the
                temporary variable, and the result is input to the
                the hash algorithm H to produce a digest value, and
                the temporary variable is set to this digest value;
              - the value of the temporary variable is XOR-ed with
                the first (next) L-octets (16 octets in case of MD5)
                of the keyNew to produce the first (next) L-octets
                (16 octets in case of MD5) of the 'delta' component.
              - the above two steps are repeated until the unused
                portion of the keyNew component is L octets or less,
           - the random component is appended to the value of the
             temporary variable, and the result is input to the
             hash algorithm H to produce a digest value;
           - this digest value, truncated if necessary to be the same
             length as the unused portion of the keyNew, is XOR-ed
             with the unused portion of the keyNew to produce the
             (final portion of the) 'delta' component.

For example, using MD5 as the hash algorithm H:

iterations = (lenOfDelta - 1)/16; /* integer division */
              temp = keyOld;
              for (i = 0; i < iterations; i++) {
                  temp = MD5 (temp || random);
                  delta[i*16 .. (i*16)+15] =
                         temp XOR keyNew[i*16 .. (i*16)+15];
              }
              temp = MD5 (temp || random);
              delta[i*16 .. lenOfDelta-1] =
                     temp XOR keyNew[i*16 .. lenOfDelta-1];

The 'random' and 'delta' components are then concatenated as
          described above, and the resulting octet string is sent to
          the recipient as the new value of an instance of this object.

At the receiver side, when an instance of this object is set
          to a new value, then a new value of K is computed as follows:

- a temporary variable is initialized to the existing value
             of K;
           - if the length of the delta component is greater than L
             octets, then:
              - the random component is appended to the value of the
                temporary variable, and the result is input to the
                hash algorithm H to produce a digest value, and the
                temporary variable is set to this digest value;
              - the value of the temporary variable is XOR-ed with
                the first (next) L-octets (16 octets in case of MD5)
                of the delta component to produce the first (next)
                L-octets (16 octets in case of MD5) of the new value
                of K.
              - the above two steps are repeated until the unused
                portion of the delta component is L octets or less,
           - the random component is appended to the value of the
             temporary variable, and the result is input to the
             hash algorithm H to produce a digest value;
           - this digest value, truncated if necessary to be the same
             length as the unused portion of the delta component, is
             XOR-ed with the unused portion of the delta component to
             produce the (final portion of the) new value of K.

For example, using MD5 as the hash algorithm H:

iterations = (lenOfDelta - 1)/16; /* integer division */
              temp = keyOld;
              for (i = 0; i < iterations; i++) {
                  temp = MD5 (temp || random);
                  keyNew[i*16 .. (i*16)+15] =
                         temp XOR delta[i*16 .. (i*16)+15];
              }
              temp = MD5 (temp || random);
              keyNew[i*16 .. lenOfDelta-1] =
                     temp XOR delta[i*16 .. lenOfDelta-1];

The value of an object with this syntax, whenever it is
          retrieved by the management protocol, is always the zero
          length string.

Note that the keyOld and keyNew are the localized keys.

Note that it is probably wise that when an SNMP entity sends
          a SetRequest to change a key, that it keeps a copy of the old
          key until it has confirmed that the key change actually
          succeeded.
         "
    SYNTAX       OCTET STRING

-- Statistics for the User-based Security Model **********************

usmStats         OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { usmMIBObjects 1 }

usmStatsUnsupportedSecLevels OBJECT-TYPE
    SYNTAX       Counter32
    MAX-ACCESS   read-only
    STATUS       current
    DESCRIPTION "The total number of packets received by the SNMP
                 engine which were dropped because they requested a
                 securityLevel that was unknown to the SNMP engine
                 or otherwise unavailable.
                "
    ::= { usmStats 1 }

usmStatsNotInTimeWindows OBJECT-TYPE
    SYNTAX       Counter32
    MAX-ACCESS   read-only
    STATUS       current
    DESCRIPTION "The total number of packets received by the SNMP
                 engine which were dropped because they appeared
                 outside of the authoritative SNMP engine's window.
                "
    ::= { usmStats 2 }

usmStatsUnknownUserNames OBJECT-TYPE
    SYNTAX       Counter32
    MAX-ACCESS   read-only
    STATUS       current
    DESCRIPTION "The total number of packets received by the SNMP
                 engine which were dropped because they referenced a
                 user that was not known to the SNMP engine.
                "
    ::= { usmStats 3 }

usmStatsUnknownEngineIDs OBJECT-TYPE
    SYNTAX       Counter32
    MAX-ACCESS   read-only
    STATUS       current
    DESCRIPTION "The total number of packets received by the SNMP
                 engine which were dropped because they referenced an
                 snmpEngineID that was not known to the SNMP engine.
                "
    ::= { usmStats 4 }

usmStatsWrongDigests OBJECT-TYPE
    SYNTAX       Counter32
    MAX-ACCESS   read-only
    STATUS       current
    DESCRIPTION "The total number of packets received by the SNMP
                 engine which were dropped because they didn't
                 contain the expected digest value.
                "
    ::= { usmStats 5 }

usmStatsDecryptionErrors OBJECT-TYPE
    SYNTAX       Counter32
    MAX-ACCESS   read-only
    STATUS       current
    DESCRIPTION "The total number of packets received by the SNMP
                 engine which were dropped because they could not be
                 decrypted.
                "
    ::= { usmStats 6 }

-- The usmUser Group ************************************************

usmUser          OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { usmMIBObjects 2 }

usmUserSpinLock  OBJECT-TYPE
    SYNTAX       TestAndIncr
    MAX-ACCESS   read-write
    STATUS       current
    DESCRIPTION "An advisory lock used to allow several cooperating
                 Command Generator Applications to coordinate their
                 use of facilities to alter secrets in the
                 usmUserTable.
                "
    ::= { usmUser 1 }

-- The table of valid users for the User-based Security Model ********

usmUserTable     OBJECT-TYPE
    SYNTAX       SEQUENCE OF UsmUserEntry
    MAX-ACCESS   not-accessible
    STATUS       current
    DESCRIPTION "The table of users configured in the SNMP engine's
                 Local Configuration Datastore (LCD).

To create a new user (i.e., to instantiate a new
                 conceptual row in this table), it is recommended to
                 follow this procedure:

1)  GET(usmUserSpinLock.0) and save in sValue.

2)  SET(usmUserSpinLock.0=sValue,
                           usmUserCloneFrom=templateUser,
                           usmUserStatus=createAndWait)
                       You should use a template user to clone from
                       which has the proper auth/priv protocol defined.

If the new user is to use privacy:

3)  generate the keyChange value based on the secret
                       privKey of the clone-from user and the secret key
                       to be used for the new user. Let us call this
                       pkcValue.
                   4)  GET(usmUserSpinLock.0) and save in sValue.
                   5)  SET(usmUserSpinLock.0=sValue,
                           usmUserPrivKeyChange=pkcValue
                           usmUserPublic=randomValue1)
                   6)  GET(usmUserPulic) and check it has randomValue1.
                       If not, repeat steps 4-6.

If the new user will never use privacy:

7)  SET(usmUserPrivProtocol=usmNoPrivProtocol)

If the new user is to use authentication:

8)  generate the keyChange value based on the secret
                       authKey of the clone-from user and the secret key
                       to be used for the new user. Let us call this
                       akcValue.
                   9)  GET(usmUserSpinLock.0) and save in sValue.
                   10) SET(usmUserSpinLock.0=sValue,
                           usmUserAuthKeyChange=akcValue
                           usmUserPublic=randomValue2)
                   11) GET(usmUserPulic) and check it has randomValue2.
                       If not, repeat steps 9-11.

If the new user will never use authentication:

12) SET(usmUserAuthProtocol=usmNoAuthProtocol)

Finally, activate the new user:

13) SET(usmUserStatus=active)

The new user should now be available and ready to be
                 used for SNMPv3 communication. Note however that access
                 to MIB data must be provided via configuration of the
                 SNMP-VIEW-BASED-ACM-MIB.

The use of usmUserSpinlock is to avoid conflicts with
                 another SNMP command generator application which may
                 also be acting on the usmUserTable.
                "
    ::= { usmUser 2 }

usmUserEntry     OBJECT-TYPE
    SYNTAX       UsmUserEntry
    MAX-ACCESS   not-accessible
    STATUS       current
    DESCRIPTION "A user configured in the SNMP engine's Local
                 Configuration Datastore (LCD) for the User-based
                 Security Model.
                "
    INDEX       { usmUserEngineID,
                  usmUserName
                }
    ::= { usmUserTable 1 }

UsmUserEntry ::= SEQUENCE
    {
        usmUserEngineID         SnmpEngineID,
        usmUserName             SnmpAdminString,
        usmUserSecurityName     SnmpAdminString,
        usmUserCloneFrom        RowPointer,
        usmUserAuthProtocol     AutonomousType,
        usmUserAuthKeyChange    KeyChange,
        usmUserOwnAuthKeyChange KeyChange,
        usmUserPrivProtocol     AutonomousType,
        usmUserPrivKeyChange    KeyChange,
        usmUserOwnPrivKeyChange KeyChange,
        usmUserPublic           OCTET STRING,
        usmUserStorageType      StorageType,
        usmUserStatus           RowStatus
    }

usmUserEngineID  OBJECT-TYPE
    SYNTAX       SnmpEngineID
    MAX-ACCESS   not-accessible
    STATUS       current
    DESCRIPTION "An SNMP engine's administratively-unique identifier.

In a simple agent, this value is always that agent's
                 own snmpEngineID value.

The value can also take the value of the snmpEngineID
                 of a remote SNMP engine with which this user can
                 communicate.
                "
    ::= { usmUserEntry 1 }

usmUserName      OBJECT-TYPE
    SYNTAX       SnmpAdminString (SIZE(1..32))
    MAX-ACCESS   not-accessible
    STATUS       current
    DESCRIPTION "A human readable string representing the name of
                 the user.

This is the (User-based Security) Model dependent
                 security ID.
                "
    ::= { usmUserEntry 2 }

usmUserSecurityName OBJECT-TYPE
    SYNTAX       SnmpAdminString
    MAX-ACCESS   read-only
    STATUS       current
    DESCRIPTION "A human readable string representing the user in
                 Security Model independent format.

The default transformation of the User-based Security
                 Model dependent security ID to the securityName and
                 vice versa is the identity function so that the
                 securityName is the same as the userName.
                "
    ::= { usmUserEntry 3 }

usmUserCloneFrom OBJECT-TYPE
    SYNTAX       RowPointer
    MAX-ACCESS   read-create
    STATUS       current
    DESCRIPTION "A pointer to another conceptual row in this
                 usmUserTable.  The user in this other conceptual
                 row is called the clone-from user.

When a new user is created (i.e., a new conceptual
                 row is instantiated in this table), the privacy and
                 authentication parameters of the new user must be
                 cloned from its clone-from user. These parameters are:
                   - authentication protocol (usmUserAuthProtocol)
                   - privacy protocol (usmUserPrivProtocol)
                 They will be copied regardless of what the current
                 value is.

Cloning also causes the initial values of the secret
                 authentication key (authKey) and the secret encryption

key (privKey) of the new user to be set to the same
                 values as the corresponding secrets of the clone-from
                 user to allow the KeyChange process to occur as
                 required during user creation.

The first time an instance of this object is set by
                 a management operation (either at or after its
                 instantiation), the cloning process is invoked.
                 Subsequent writes are successful but invoke no
                 action to be taken by the receiver.
                 The cloning process fails with an 'inconsistentName'
                 error if the conceptual row representing the
                 clone-from user does not exist or is not in an active
                 state when the cloning process is invoked.

When this object is read, the ZeroDotZero OID
                 is returned.
                "
    ::= { usmUserEntry 4 }

usmUserAuthProtocol OBJECT-TYPE
    SYNTAX       AutonomousType
    MAX-ACCESS   read-create
    STATUS       current
    DESCRIPTION "An indication of whether messages sent on behalf of
                 this user to/from the SNMP engine identified by
                 usmUserEngineID, can be authenticated, and if so,
                 the type of authentication protocol which is used.

An instance of this object is created concurrently
                 with the creation of any other object instance for
                 the same user (i.e., as part of the processing of
                 the set operation which creates the first object
                 instance in the same conceptual row).

If an initial set operation (i.e. at row creation time)
                 tries to set a value for an unknown or unsupported
                 protocol, then a 'wrongValue' error must be returned.

The value will be overwritten/set when a set operation
                 is performed on the corresponding instance of
                 usmUserCloneFrom.

Once instantiated, the value of such an instance of
                 this object can only be changed via a set operation to
                 the value of the usmNoAuthProtocol.

If a set operation tries to change the value of an

existing instance of this object to any value other
                 than usmNoAuthProtocol, then an 'inconsistentValue'
                 error must be returned.

If a set operation tries to set the value to the
                 usmNoAuthProtocol while the usmUserPrivProtocol value
                 in the same row is not equal to usmNoPrivProtocol,
                 then an 'inconsistentValue' error must be returned.
                 That means that an SNMP command generator application
                 must first ensure that the usmUserPrivProtocol is set
                 to the usmNoPrivProtocol value before it can set
                 the usmUserAuthProtocol value to usmNoAuthProtocol.
                "
    DEFVAL      { usmNoAuthProtocol }
    ::= { usmUserEntry 5 }

usmUserAuthKeyChange OBJECT-TYPE
    SYNTAX       KeyChange   -- typically (SIZE (0 | 32)) for HMACMD5
                             -- typically (SIZE (0 | 40)) for HMACSHA
    MAX-ACCESS   read-create
    STATUS       current
    DESCRIPTION "An object, which when modified, causes the secret
                 authentication key used for messages sent on behalf
                 of this user to/from the SNMP engine identified by
                 usmUserEngineID, to be modified via a one-way
                 function.

The associated protocol is the usmUserAuthProtocol.
                 The associated secret key is the user's secret
                 authentication key (authKey). The associated hash
                 algorithm is the algorithm used by the user's
                 usmUserAuthProtocol.

When creating a new user, it is an 'inconsistentName'
                 error for a set operation to refer to this object
                 unless it is previously or concurrently initialized
                 through a set operation on the corresponding instance
                 of usmUserCloneFrom.

When the value of the corresponding usmUserAuthProtocol
                 is usmNoAuthProtocol, then a set is successful, but
                 effectively is a no-op.

When this object is read, the zero-length (empty)
                 string is returned.

The recommended way to do a key change is as follows:

1) GET(usmUserSpinLock.0) and save in sValue.
                   2) generate the keyChange value based on the old
                      (existing) secret key and the new secret key,
                      let us call this kcValue.

If you do the key change on behalf of another user:

3) SET(usmUserSpinLock.0=sValue,
                          usmUserAuthKeyChange=kcValue
                          usmUserPublic=randomValue)

If you do the key change for yourself:

4) SET(usmUserSpinLock.0=sValue,
                          usmUserOwnAuthKeyChange=kcValue
                          usmUserPublic=randomValue)

If you get a response with error-status of noError,
                 then the SET succeeded and the new key is active.
                 If you do not get a response, then you can issue a
                 GET(usmUserPublic) and check if the value is equal
                 to the randomValue you did send in the SET. If so, then
                 the key change succeeded and the new key is active
                 (probably the response got lost). If not, then the SET
                 request probably never reached the target and so you
                 can start over with the procedure above.
                "
    DEFVAL      { ''H }    -- the empty string
    ::= { usmUserEntry 6 }

usmUserOwnAuthKeyChange OBJECT-TYPE
    SYNTAX       KeyChange   -- typically (SIZE (0 | 32)) for HMACMD5
                             -- typically (SIZE (0 | 40)) for HMACSHA
    MAX-ACCESS   read-create
    STATUS       current
    DESCRIPTION "Behaves exactly as usmUserAuthKeyChange, with one
                 notable difference: in order for the set operation
                 to succeed, the usmUserName of the operation
                 requester must match the usmUserName that
                 indexes the row which is targeted by this
                 operation.
                 In addition, the USM security model must be
                 used for this operation.

The idea here is that access to this column can be
                 public, since it will only allow a user to change
                 his own secret authentication key (authKey).
                 Note that this can only be done once the row is active.

When a set is received and the usmUserName of the
                 requester is not the same as the umsUserName that
                 indexes the row which is targeted by this operation,
                 then a 'noAccess' error must be returned.

When a set is received and the security model in use
                 is not USM, then a 'noAccess' error must be returned.
                "
    DEFVAL      { ''H }    -- the empty string
    ::= { usmUserEntry 7 }

usmUserPrivProtocol OBJECT-TYPE
    SYNTAX       AutonomousType
    MAX-ACCESS   read-create
    STATUS       current
    DESCRIPTION "An indication of whether messages sent on behalf of
                 this user to/from the SNMP engine identified by
                 usmUserEngineID, can be protected from disclosure,
                 and if so, the type of privacy protocol which is used.

If an initial set operation (i.e. at row creation time)
                 tries to set a value for an unknown or unsupported
                 protocol, then a 'wrongValue' error must be returned.

The value will be overwritten/set when a set operation
                 is performed on the corresponding instance of
                 usmUserCloneFrom.

Once instantiated, the value of such an instance of
                 this object can only be changed via a set operation to
                 the value of the usmNoPrivProtocol.

If a set operation tries to change the value of an
                 existing instance of this object to any value other
                 than usmNoPrivProtocol, then an 'inconsistentValue'
                 error must be returned.

Note that if any privacy protocol is used, then you
                 must also use an authentication protocol. In other
                 words, if usmUserPrivProtocol is set to anything else
                 than usmNoPrivProtocol, then the corresponding instance
                 of usmUserAuthProtocol cannot have a value of

usmNoAuthProtocol. If it does, then an
                 'inconsistentValue' error must be returned.
                "
    DEFVAL      { usmNoPrivProtocol }
    ::= { usmUserEntry 8 }

usmUserPrivKeyChange OBJECT-TYPE
    SYNTAX       KeyChange  -- typically (SIZE (0 | 32)) for DES
    MAX-ACCESS   read-create
    STATUS       current
    DESCRIPTION "An object, which when modified, causes the secret
                 encryption key used for messages sent on behalf
                 of this user to/from the SNMP engine identified by
                 usmUserEngineID, to be modified via a one-way
                 function.

The associated protocol is the usmUserPrivProtocol.
                 The associated secret key is the user's secret
                 privacy key (privKey). The associated hash
                 algorithm is the algorithm used by the user's
                 usmUserAuthProtocol.

When the value of the corresponding usmUserPrivProtocol
                 is usmNoPrivProtocol, then a set is successful, but
                 effectively is a no-op.

When this object is read, the zero-length (empty)
                 string is returned.
                 See the description clause of usmUserAuthKeyChange for
                 a recommended procedure to do a key change.
                "
    DEFVAL      { ''H }    -- the empty string
    ::= { usmUserEntry 9 }

usmUserOwnPrivKeyChange OBJECT-TYPE
    SYNTAX       KeyChange  -- typically (SIZE (0 | 32)) for DES
    MAX-ACCESS   read-create
    STATUS       current
    DESCRIPTION "Behaves exactly as usmUserPrivKeyChange, with one
                 notable difference: in order for the Set operation
                 to succeed, the usmUserName of the operation
                 requester must match the usmUserName that indexes

the row which is targeted by this operation.
                 In addition, the USM security model must be
                 used for this operation.

The idea here is that access to this column can be
                 public, since it will only allow a user to change
                 his own secret privacy key (privKey).
                 Note that this can only be done once the row is active.

When a set is received and the security model in use
                 is not USM, then a 'noAccess' error must be returned.
                "
    DEFVAL      { ''H }    -- the empty string
    ::= { usmUserEntry 10 }

usmUserPublic    OBJECT-TYPE
    SYNTAX       OCTET STRING (SIZE(0..32))
    MAX-ACCESS   read-create
    STATUS       current
    DESCRIPTION "A publicly-readable value which can be written as part
                 of the procedure for changing a user's secret
                 authentication and/or privacy key, and later read to
                 determine whether the change of the secret was
                 effected.
                "
    DEFVAL      { ''H }  -- the empty string
    ::= { usmUserEntry 11 }

usmUserStorageType OBJECT-TYPE
    SYNTAX       StorageType
    MAX-ACCESS   read-create
    STATUS       current
    DESCRIPTION "The storage type for this conceptual row.

Conceptual rows having the value 'permanent' must
                 allow write-access at a minimum to:

- usmUserAuthKeyChange, usmUserOwnAuthKeyChange
                   and usmUserPublic for a user who employs
                   authentication, and
                 - usmUserPrivKeyChange, usmUserOwnPrivKeyChange
                   and usmUserPublic for a user who employs
                   privacy.

Note that any user who employs authentication or
                 privacy must allow its secret(s) to be updated and
                 thus cannot be 'readOnly'.

If an initial set operation tries to set the value to
                 'readOnly' for a user who employs authentication or
                 privacy, then an 'inconsistentValue' error must be
                 returned.  Note that if the value has been previously
                 set (implicit or explicit) to any value, then the rules
                 as defined in the StorageType Textual Convention apply.

It is an implementation issue to decide if a SET for
                 a readOnly or permanent row is accepted at all. In some
                 contexts this may make sense, in others it may not. If
                 a SET for a readOnly or permanent row is not accepted
                 at all, then a 'wrongValue' error must be returned.
                "
    DEFVAL      { nonVolatile }
    ::= { usmUserEntry 12 }

usmUserStatus    OBJECT-TYPE
    SYNTAX       RowStatus
    MAX-ACCESS   read-create
    STATUS       current
    DESCRIPTION "The status of this conceptual row.

Until instances of all corresponding columns are
                 appropriately configured, the value of the
                 corresponding instance of the usmUserStatus column
                 is 'notReady'.

In particular, a newly created row for a user who
                 employs authentication, cannot be made active until the
                 corresponding usmUserCloneFrom and usmUserAuthKeyChange
                 have been set.

Further, a newly created row for a user who also
                 employs privacy, cannot be made active until the
                 usmUserPrivKeyChange has been set.

The RowStatus TC [RFC2579] requires that this
                 DESCRIPTION clause states under which circumstances
                 other objects in this row can be modified:

The value of this object has no effect on whether
                 other objects in this conceptual row can be modified,
                 except for usmUserOwnAuthKeyChange and
                 usmUserOwnPrivKeyChange. For these 2 objects, the

value of usmUserStatus MUST be active.
                "
    ::= { usmUserEntry 13 }

-- Conformance Information *******************************************

usmMIBCompliances OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { usmMIBConformance 1 }
usmMIBGroups      OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { usmMIBConformance 2 }

-- Compliance statements

usmMIBCompliance MODULE-COMPLIANCE
    STATUS       current
    DESCRIPTION "The compliance statement for SNMP engines which
                 implement the SNMP-USER-BASED-SM-MIB.
                "

MODULE       -- this module
        MANDATORY-GROUPS { usmMIBBasicGroup }

OBJECT           usmUserAuthProtocol
        MIN-ACCESS       read-only
        DESCRIPTION     "Write access is not required."

OBJECT           usmUserPrivProtocol
        MIN-ACCESS       read-only
        DESCRIPTION     "Write access is not required."
    ::= { usmMIBCompliances 1 }

-- Units of compliance
usmMIBBasicGroup OBJECT-GROUP
    OBJECTS     {
                  usmStatsUnsupportedSecLevels,
                  usmStatsNotInTimeWindows,
                  usmStatsUnknownUserNames,
                  usmStatsUnknownEngineIDs,
                  usmStatsWrongDigests,
                  usmStatsDecryptionErrors,
                  usmUserSpinLock,
                  usmUserSecurityName,
                  usmUserCloneFrom,
                  usmUserAuthProtocol,
                  usmUserAuthKeyChange,
                  usmUserOwnAuthKeyChange,
                  usmUserPrivProtocol,
                  usmUserPrivKeyChange,
                  usmUserOwnPrivKeyChange,
                  usmUserPublic,
                  usmUserStorageType,
                  usmUserStatus
                }
    STATUS       current
    DESCRIPTION "A collection of objects providing for configuration
                 of an SNMP engine which implements the SNMP
                 User-based Security Model.
                "
    ::= { usmMIBGroups 1 }

END